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Shuler: In Re State Appeals in Criminal Prosecutions

NOTES
IN RE STATE APPEALS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS'
INTRODUCTION

At the outset, the writer wishes to convey to his readers that it
is not his purpose to review extensively the history of the law relative
to appeal. To do so would be to attempt, unsuccessfully, to cover
a subject which has been thoroughly covered.' Nor will the author
attempt to cover in its entirety the criminal appellate field as it exists today in England and in this country. This too, has been
substantially accomplished. 2 The intent of the author is to present
certain aspects of this subject to the Bench, Bar, General Assembly,
and future law-makers and dispensers of justice - the'law student
-of South Carolina for consideration relative to future legislation.
HISTRY"

rn' order to establish a premise for further '.discourse, ii sees

proper to peer briefly into the pages of English history relative
to appeal in criminal actions. One of the early instances of appeal
was from a "verdict" in the action of appeal of felony. The appeal
of felony must riot be confused'with the present day appeal in criminal
cases; in reality.it was the title of an action which existed in England after theNorman Conquest, and was a private -accusation
against a wrongdoer made by the one wronged or by his representative. In his'work on Criminal Appeals3 Profes~or Orfield writes:
The appealwas tried by battle. The appellor made a minute
and highly formal statement before the coroner as to -the nature
of the offense. The coroner enrolled the statement: The appearance of the appellee was then secured by publishing the
appeal at five successive county courts. If he failed to appear
he was outlawed. If he did appear, he might resort to a number of pleas or exceptions. If he did not plead or pleaded inadequately, battle was waged except where there was a very
strong case against the appellee. If the appellee was defeated
before the stars appeared he was hanged. If not, or if he won,
he was acquitted. At one time the appellee in spite of such acquittal could still be tried by .jury on indictment. After 1846,
1. OIIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERIcA. (1939); MiLLER, APPEALS BY
THE STATE IN CRIMINAL CAsEs, 36 Yale L. J. 486 (1927).

2. Note 1, supra.
3.

ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AmmucA
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indictments were usually tried first, the defendant still being
subject to an appeal even though acquitted by the jury. [Italics
added.]
Perhaps that which has influenced our present day judicial process more than any other one thing is the writ of error. The date
at which the writ entered the judicial process seems to be somewhat
obscure. It seems certain however, that the writ of error did not
issue as a matter of right prior to the American Revolution. Lord
Mansfield, in reviewing the history of the writ of error, made the
following-observations :4
After a writ of error was granted by the king the attorneygeneral never made any opposition; because either he had certified there was error, and then he could not argue against
his own certificate; or the crown meant to shew favor, and
then he had orders "not to oppose". The king, who alonewas
concerned as a prosecutor, and who had the absolute power
of pardon, being willing that the outlawry should be reversed,
this court [King's Bench] reversed upon very slight and trivial
objections, which could not have prevailed if any opposition
had been made.
In commenting on the writ of error, Sir William Blackstone
stated :s
A judgment may be reversed by a writ of error: which lies
from all inferior criminal jurisdictions to the court of king's
bench, and from the king's bench to the house of peers; and
may be brought for notorious mistakes in the judgment of other
parts of the record: .

.

. These writs of error, to reverse judg-

ment in case of misdemeanors, are not to be allowed of course,
[Italics Added] but on sufficient probable cause shown to the
attorney-general; and then they are understood to be grantable
of common right, and ex debitio justitiae. But writs of error
to review attainders in capital cases are only allowed ex gratia;
and not without express warrant under the king's sign manual,
or at least by the consent of the attorney-general . . . These

therefore can rarely be brought by the party himself, especially
where he is attainted for an offense against the state: but they
may be brought by his heir, or executor, after his death, in
more favorable times: which may be consolation to his family .. .
4. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (1770).
5. 4 BILAcxsToXzC's COMMtNTARIES 384, 385 (4th Ed. 1771).
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The Criminal Appeal Act, 1907,6 abolished the writ of error.
This Act allows a defendant a review of his case on its merits, with
the absolute right vesting in the defendant to appeal on a question
of law, or on a question of fact with permission of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, or upon the certificate of the trial judge, or on
questions of mixed law and fact, or on any other ground appearing to the court to be sufficient. The Court of Criminal Appeal is
granted wide powers in the disposition of a case. It may go to
the extent of quashing the sentence of the trial court, of directing
an acquittal, or of substituting a more or less severe sentence.
The Act provides that on a question of law of exceptional public
importance, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the prosecutor,
or the defendant, with the sanction of the Attorney-General, may
appeal from a decision of the Court of Crimifial Appeals to the
7
House of Lords.
Whether the crown could appeal prior to passage of the Criminal
Appeal At presents a question On which there is divided opinion.
Mr. Justice Buchanan, in State v. Bucaoaan,8 affirmatively answers
the question, concluding that "in the opinion of Lord Hale, the king
might have a writ of error in a criminal case; since it would be
absurd to say that a man who had obtained a judgment of acquittal
for a defect in the indictment, or on a special verdict, could never
again be indicted for the same offense, until that judgment was reversed by a writ of error, if a writ of error would not lie."
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States, per
Mr. Justice Gray, has taken the opposite view.9 It has said that
the theory of the king having a writ of error after judgment for the
defendant had little support beyond sayings of Lord Coke and
Lord Hale, which seemed to apply, but by no means affirmed it as
a fact. It is apparent that Mr. Justices Buchanan and Gray referred
to the same quotations of authority, the latter jurist discounting
Lord Hale to be such authority as to establish as a fact the right
of the crown to appeal. Judicial consensus affirms the opinion of
Mr. Justice Gray.
CoNFusIoN IN APPELLATE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY

It has been shown that a state of confusion in regard to criminal
appellate law existed in England until passage of the Criminal
6.
7.
8.
9.

7 EDw. 7, § 20 (1907) Effective April 18, 1908.
Note 6, § 1(6) supra.
5 H. & J.317, 9 Md. Rep. 259 (1821).
United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 12 Sup. Ct. 609, 36 L. Ed. 445

(1892).
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Appeal Act, 1907. Some tffthis confusiofn cArried over ititto the
jurisprudence of the United States and is in eiiSteftce today. This
can be explained in part by the fact that the colonists from England
brought with them only so much of the Common Law of England
and acts of parliament as were applicable to their new conditions
and surroundings. A great part of this law remained with them
when they became independent states, some of it being incorporated into the constitutiong of the several states, other portions being
adopted by statute.' 0 Because of the existing disorder in the appellate law of England, the several states apparently enacted legislation as the state deemed expedient, in order to obviate any internal
confusion in regard to criminal appellate practice.
On one point, however, there is no substantial diversity of legislation, for no state refuses to allow an accused the right of appeal,
so long as the rules of criminal procedure of the state are adhered
to.
A manifest la k of unifotmity crops out when state appellate legislation is reviewed. In a majority of the states appeals are allowed
the prosecution." Several of the states however, deny the prosetution any right of appeal.' 2 To bear out the diversity of criminal
appellate legislation, consider the following legislation:
Minnesota refuses to allow the State to appeal or seek a review
in a criminal case at any time, regardless of circumstances, even
on a point of law arising prior to trial. That court conceded howi
ever, that the legislature might properly confer upon the state the
authority to secure the opinion of the court of last resort upof
questions of law arising at the trial, before subjecting the party
charged to a final trial.13 The pertinent sections of the Minnesota
statutes reveal that the legislature has not Seen fit as yet to grant
to the state that right,14 as clearly the statute speaks only in terms
of appeals by the defendant.
Under a section of the Penal Code of California providing that
'an appeal may be taken by the people .. . from an order titade
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people," it
waS held that the people could appeal from a court order amend10. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIiINAi LAW (1894), p. 17.

11. For a very comprehensive, if not exhaustive, coverage of state tattites
allowing appeals by the prosecution, see Notes, 92 A.L.R. 1137, 113 A.L.R. 636,

157 A.L.R. 1065; MILLER, APPBAILS BY THE STAT4 1n CRIMINAL CASs, Note
1, supra.
12. A review of the state statutes discloses that denial of appeal in behalf
of the state is the law in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Texas, Florida and Illinois.
13. City of St. Paul v. Stamm, 106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154 (1908).
14. MINN. CODE, § 632.01 through § 632.10 (1941).
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ing and modifying a judgment of conviction by substituting a fine
15
for an original prison sentence.
Nebraska allows the county attorney to bring a bill of exceptions
to the state supreme court to determine a question of law to govern
in pending cases, or that may arise subsequently in similar actions,
but determination of the law has no effect on the accused in the
16
action appealed from.
Where the punishment is by fine alone, Kentucky allows the state
to appeal, even from a directed verdict for the defendant, in misdemeanor cases.1 7 The Supreme Court of Georgia has gone so far
as to hold that-it will not consider points raised by the state on an
appeal taken by the defendant.' 8 Louisiana only allows appeals
by the state from judgments quashing indictments which charge
capital, offenses; or offenses whose penalty may be imprisonment -at
hard labor.' 9 But in Maryland, even in the absence of a statute
allowing the state to appeal, it has been held that the state is entitled
to a review of a judgment in favor of a defendant if such judgment
is rendered prior to a verdict. 20
In South Carolina, the state is granted the right of appeal from
an order granting a new trial, where the grant was wholly predicated
22
on an error of law, 21 or from an order quashing an indictment,
or from a judgment which substantially amounts to a quashing of
an indictment.23 But the state may not-appeal from an acquittal.
For example, in a prosecution for assaulting and resisting an officer,
under the charge of the trial judge, the defendants were acquitted.
The state appealed, alleging error in the charge. Our Supreme
Court, basing its decision on the immunity from double jeopardy
as is found in the state constitution,2 4 said: "Whether or not the
circuit judge erred in his rulings of the law, the defendants were
acquitted and are now out of court" 2 5

15. People v. Maggio, 96 Cal. App. 409, 274 Pac. 611 (1929).
16. NEn. Rzv. STAT., § 29-2314 through § 29-2316.
17. Commonwealth v. Williams, 230 Ky. 71, 18 S. W. 2d 881 (1929); Commonwealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 602, 102 S. W. 2d 382 (1936).
18. Bryan v. State of Georgia, 3 Ga. App. 26, 59 S. E. 185 (1907).
19. State v. Harrison, 154' La. 1011, 98 So. 622 (1923).
20. Note 8, supra.
21. State v. Deschamps, 126 S. C. 416, 120 S. E. 491 (1923).
22, State v. Young, 30 S. C. 399, 9 S. E. 355 (1888); State v. Bouknight,
55 S. C. 353, 33 S. E. 451 (1891).
23, State v. Long, 66 S. C. 398, 44 S. E. 960 (1903).
24. S. C. CoxsT. Art. 1, § 17.
25. State v. Gathers, 15 S. C. 370 (1881), followed in State v. Ivey, 73 S. C.
282, 53 S. E. 428 (1905).
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DouBLE

JEOPARDY

Thus far, attention has not been directed to a statute providing
for an appeal by the state from an acquittal of a defendant of a
crime punishable either by death or imprisonment. Prior to 1886,
no state enacted a statute allowing the state to appeal under such
circumstances.2 6 Why? The denial of the state to appeal from
such acquittals rested, and still rests in fo.,-six of the United
States, partly on the historical background, partly on our constitutional law, and partly on public policy. But without doubt, the true
27
basis for such denial rests on the doctrine of double jeopardy.
It has been said that the doctrine of double jeopardy is no more
than the adoption of the Common Law pleas of autrefois acquit and
convict,2 8 with the important distinction that the former pleas presuppose a verdict, while the latter may serve to discharge an accused
prior to a verdict.29 A voice of authority states that the double
jeopardy doctrine grew up in England at a time when there was no
right of appeal.3 0
Double jeopardy is applicable to cases in which an accused is
placed in danger of life and limb; or, as stated to be South Carolina law, jeopardy attaches when a legal jury is sworn and empaneled
to try the accused on a valid indictment in a competent court. 31
Consequently, double jeopardy does not apply to an order quashing
an indictment, 32 nor to one sustaining a demurrer to an indictment.38 In neither of these instances has the accused been placed
in jeopardy as no jury has been impaneled and sworn. Certainly
the doctrine is not applicable after an acquittal if the decision 'on
which the state is appealing is merely to settle a point of law, with
no adverse effect whatever upon the one acquitted. 34 Nor does
double jeopardy apply in a case over which the court has no jurisdiction,8 ,5 and it does not lie from an order granting an accused a new
trlial;68 this being based on the theory that the accused has waived
his immunity from prosecution. One cannot, by one and the same
act, protect himself by, using his sword as a shield. Nor can the
26. In 1886, Connecticut enacted such a statute,
note 41, infra.
27. Note 3, p. 56-58, supra.

GrN. STxAT. § 1637.

See

28. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRActiCS, p. 353 (9th Ed. 1889).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
135.
36.

Note 28, p. 355, sepra.
Note 3, p. 292, supra.
State v. Rountree, 127 S. C. 261, 121 S. E. 205 (1924).
State v. Ray, 1 Rice 33 (1938).
State v. Hall, 27 Wyo. 224, 194 Pac. 476 (1921).
Territory v. Gomez, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac. 702 (1912).
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. 652 (1871).
State v. Gillis, 73 S. C. 318, 53 S. E. 487 (1905).
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defendant be said to be twice in jeopardy by a ruling on a question
of law adverse to the state where the defendant appeals from a con37
viction.
A case of far reaching influence in the field of double jeopardy
is Kepner v. United States.38 In that case, a practicing attorneya resident of the Philippine Islands - was tried and acquitted of
the crime of embezzlement. In appellate proceedings by the United
States, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed the
judgment of the trial court, and imposed a prison sentence upon the
accused. Error was assigned in the appellate Court on the ground
that the accused had been put in jeopardy a second time by the
appellate proceedings, in violation of the law against twice placing
a person on trial for the same offense, and contrAty to the Coiistitution of the United States. The United States Supreme Couit reversed tht Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, holding the d&fendant to have been twice placed in jeopardy in violation of a C.ofigressional Act providing immunity frofn secohd jeopardy tot" the
same criminal offense. In the majority opinion of the Kepet case,
per Mr. Justice Day, the court makes a CurSory examination of the
case of State v. Lei3 9 as being in oppositioii to the view of double
jeopardy as taken by the majority. It speakitig of the Let casd,
Mr. Justice Day states: "But no reference is made in the course
of the opinion to any constitutional requirement in Connecticut as
to dotble jeopardy. An examination of the constitution of that
state and amendments as published ... discloses no provision upon
the subject of jeopardy, and we conclude there is rione". From
this language, the inference may be drawft that a second trial of
one for the same offense could be sanctioned by the Supreme Court
of our land if there was no state constitutional provision against it.40
In the dissenting opinion of the principal case, delivered by Mr.
Justice Holmes, and concurred in by White and Mtkenna, J. J.,
it is said that "one would no more be placed in jebpatdy a second
time when tetried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than
he would be when retried for a mistake that did him harm".
37. It is obvious that in such a case the initiative is taken by the defendant;
if he does not wish to appeal, the rulings may not be reviewed. Such rulings

will probably not receive very careful attention as the defendant is trying to

upset a conviction, while the state is not trying to upset an acquittal. Note 3,
p. 64, su ra.
38. 195U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904).
39. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110 (1894).
40. The United States Supreme Court must decide a case in the light of

the law of the state in which the case arose, provided the state law does not

impinge upon the Federal Constitution. Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U. S.64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1937). This case overruled Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U. S.1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842).
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The expressions of these two eminent jurists leads to a discussion of the statutes- of which there are two in the United States
- by which the state is allowed to appeal from an acquittal of a
defendant.
In Connecticut, there extists a statutory provision whereby appeals from the rulings and decisions of the superior court or the
court of common pleas, upon all questions of law arising on the
trial of criminal cases, may be taken by the state, with permission
of the trial judge, to the Supreme Court of Errors, in the same
manner and to the same effect as if made by the accused. 41 In the
application of the statute, the well reasoned opinion of State v.
Lee4 holds that the function of all courts is to settle controversies
according to law, such being secured only by the correction of errors
in the application of the law. "The end is not reached, the cause
is not finished, until both the facts, and the law applicable to the
facts, are finally determined. The principle of finality is essential;
but not more essential than the principle of justice." The court is
of the opinion that judicious legislation for securing a full, fair,
and legal trial of each criminal cause is not in derogation, but in
protection, of individual right, and is in full accord with the principle that no man shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.
And placing in jeopardy is held to mean a jeopardy which is real,
and has continued through every stage of one prosecution, as fixed
by existing state laws relative to procedure.
The state of Vermont has a statute of substantially the same
effect as that of Connecticut. 43 The application of the Vermont
statute is not based on the "continuous process" theory as applicable in Connecticut, but rather that the statute does not impinge
upon the provisions of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution."
The court reviews cases 4 5 wherein
the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment, forbidding double jeopardy, was not intended to limit the
powers of the State government in respect to their own people, but
was merely to operate as a restraint upon federal action. Further,
that the due process of law referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment, wherein restraint is imposed upon state action, is due process according to the Constitution and laws of the pa'ticular state
41. CoNN. Ri,. STAT., § 8812 (1949).

42. Note 39, supra.

See note 26, supra.

43. VT. R v. STAT., § 2356 (1947).

44. State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 AtI. 23 (1918).
45. Ex Parte Spier, 123 U. S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 21, 31 L. Ed. 80 (1887);

Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151 (1907).
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involved, provided the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"
46
are not violated.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OV STATE APPELLATE

LEGISLATION

OPERATING AMTER AcQUITTAL

In the landmark case of Palko v. Connecticut,47 the state criminal
appellate statute of Connecticut withstood the test of constitutionality. There the accused was indicted for murder in the first degree, convicted of murder in the second degree. The State appealed,
alleging error on the part of the trial judge in excluding certain
evidence. The appeal was heard by the State Supreme Court of
Errors and Appeals, and was promptly reversed for a new trial.
On the second trial, the accused was convicted of murder in the
first degree and sentenced to death. The accused appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that the statute permitting the state to appeal was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, that whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is also
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Fifth Amendment expressly forbids one being placed in jeopardy twice: for the
same offense.
Mr. Justice Cardoio, in writing the opinion of the court, held
that what would be a violation of the first eight amendments - the
Bill of Rights-would not necessarily be unlawful by force of
the Fourteenth. In repudiating the defendant's contention in regard to the Bill of Rights being carried over in toto to the Four-:
teenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Cardozo launched into a discussion of the various innovations of the states which subsequently
were held not to violate the provisions of the Federal Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment, inter alia, provides that no person shall
be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime unless on
presentment or indictment of a grand jury. This edict of necessity
must be followed by the Federal Government in its prosecutions,
but the Supreme Court has held that, in prosecutions by a state,
presentment or indictment by a grand jury may give way to informations at the instance of a public officer. 48 A further provision
of the Fifth Amendment is that no person shall be compelled to be
46. Ex Parte Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 10 Sup. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519 (1880).
47. 302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
48. Hurtado v. People of State of California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 292,
28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
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a witness against himself in a criminal case; but in prosecutions
by the state, this exemption will end if the state so chooses.4 9 The
Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial in criminal cases, and the
Seventh requires a jury trial in civil cases at Common Law where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars. But the Supreme Court has ruled that trial by jury in state actions may be
modified or abolished.5 0
On- the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment may make it unlawful for a state to abridge by statute
the guaranty of free speech given by. the First Amendment, 5 1 or
the freedom of the press, 52" of the free exercise of religion, 58 or
the right of peaceable assembly, without which free speech would
be unduly trampled, 54 or the right of an accused to the benefit of
counsel. 55 In these- situations immunities are valid as against the
federal government by force of the specific pledges of the particular
amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, having been found to
be, in the words of 'Mr. Justice Cardozo, "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," and are thus valid as against a state, via the
Fourteenth Amendment. With reference to the various provisions
of the- Bill bf. Rights as -pointed out above, "they are not of the
very essence of a scheme:of, ordered liberty, and to abolish them
would not violate any principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as. fundamental".
In reviewing the statute uider .onsideration, the court held that
it was not the states intent to "wear: the accused out'! by a series
of.trials; but that the statute only asked, that the trial go on until
a trial should be .had which wag free from cofrosive error.,
.Itcannot be saidthat the court regarded the instant case as one
of double jeopardy, for Mr.. Justice Cardozo used the phrase "if
double jeopardy it may be called",, He ,also cast. a doubt as to
whether a case of like facts and' circumstances would constitute
double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.
49. Twining v. State of New Jersey, ?11 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed.

97 (1908).
50. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. '581, 20 Sup. Ct. 488, 44 L. Ed. 597 (1900);
N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct 247, 61 L. Ed. 667

(1917).
51. De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U. S.353, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed.
278 (1937) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S.242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732, 31 L. Ed. 1066
(1937).
52. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S.- 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed.
1357 (1931).
53. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 600 Sup. Ct. 900, 84
L. Ed. 1213 (1940).
54. Note 51, supra.

55. Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U. S.45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158
(1932).
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An interesting and logical observation has been made of the principle case 56 to the effect that the Supreme Court, in determining the
constitutionality of the Connecticut statute, might have predicated
its decision on either of two rationales, It could have considered
the original trial, reversal, and retrial as one proceeding- obviating
the question of double jeopardy, or it could have held that the statutory procedure was not such an unreasonable deprivation of the
rights of the accused as to be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendmcnt. The former rationale was,not applied; probably because of
the decision in Kepner v. United Stte.s,5 7 in which the court recognized a spearate proceeding. By basing its decision on the second
rationale, the court, of necesity, held that the guaranty against
double jeopardy "if double jeopardy it may be called'" is not included in the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is assumed that in cases of like fact subsequently arising in
either Connecticut or Vermont, an appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States would result in a judgment alike- to that reached
in the Palko case.
But what would be the outcome of a case originating in a state

prohibiting, in its Constitution, one to be tried twice for the same
offeose, but whiqh had also enacted a statqte allowing the prosecution to appeal, from an acquittal. Would sVhch a situation present
a conflict of laws within the state, SQ that the statuto would be
battered down as being an impingmnt upon the constitutional provision against double jeopardy? The question can be answered in
the negative, provided the state supreme court construes its own
state constitution as following the "one eontinuous process" theory
as adopted in Connecticut, If such process were adopted no second jeopardy could attach until a trial free from error was had.
And certainly the double jeopardy clause of the state constitution
would preclude a succesAful appeal by the state in g case in which
no error was committed.
The Palko case does not present, by any means, the inescapable
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be invoked to
prevent successive jeopardies of an accused, thus, should a state
statute attempt to sanction a second trial where no error had been
committed in the original proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment
undoubtedly would be held to apply.5 8
An earnest attempt has been made to discover a South Carolina
case by which the invocation of a statute granting the state the
56. 47 YALiE L. Y.489 (1938).
57. Note 38, ;opra.

58. Note 57, p. 493, supra.
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right to appeal would possibly have resulted in a more perfect dispensation of justice. No case has been found which fully restates
an error of law committed in the original trial. However, the early
Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, et al.5 9 will aptly
illustrate the point.
The defendants were indicted and placed on trial for murder. On
the fifth day of deliberation, with the term of court drawing to a
close, the jury still had not reached a verdict. They had come into
court repeatedly and affirmed that they could not agree. The judge
stated that he was satisfied that it was useless to detain the jury
longer, therefore, notwithstanding the objection of the defendants,
the jury was discharged. The defendants were again called for trial
the following month. At this time they pleaded the former trial
and discharge of the jury without Tendering a verdict in bar of
any further trial for the same offense. The commonwealth demurred to this plea, judgment entered for the defendants on the
demurrer. The state supreme court upheld the verdict and judgment on the ground that it was settled law in the state of Pennsylvania that a court has no power to, discharge a jury aftex a, trial
begips, without a. resulting discharge of the prisoner, unless it be
done with hiA cQnse.nt Qr be-ause of an bs.olute necessity for so
doing. The trial colurt was erppowered t9 e.xtend the. term until
the trial coud be c r cluded, thu the inability of the jury to agree
within a few hours or day. when the terrp is abouit tq expire, dploe
9wt raise s1ugh a necessity. The cotrtr, per Mr. Justiec- Williams,
stated,:
The justice of sustaining a plea of former acquittal or conviction is unquestioned and unquestionable; but a plea of "once
in jeopardy" stands on narrower ground. It alleges only that
there might have been a conviction or an acquittal, if the judge
trying the cause had not made a mistake in law which prevented a verdict. It is of no consequence how many mistakes he makes, if the trial results in a conviction. The mistakes. can be corrected on a. writ of error and the defendant
tried over again. But if the mistake results in closing the trial
without a verdict, this is. remediless. The court that made it
cannot correct it. The proper court of review cannot correct
it. The consequence is that a defendant charged with taking
the life of his felow man goes out of the court and out of the
reach of jtstice becaus.e of a mistake in law made after an honest
$9. 121 Pa. St. Rep. 109. This case was cited by Miller as proving the desirability of thq Connecticut rule. Note 1, p. 495, supra.
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and painstaking effort to be right .. . But the constitutional
provision [double jeopardy] is plain and its enforcement by
the courts has been uniform. 60
STATx APPELLATE LGiwsLATIoN

-

PRO

Benefit to Society: Society, in its fundamental concept, comprises all
of citizens of the state. Law exists for the protection of society. The
right of society to be protected from lawlessness is inherent in society itself. It is for this reason that the sovereign punishes the
wrongdoer; fine and/or imprisonment being the end result, a. trial
in the court, of General Sessions being the means to that end. To
allow the means to be stopped short of attaining the just end' if the
termination of the means is predicated on legal error, is to deny to
society its inherent right. To liberate ind cast into the midst of
society one of ostensible, if not apparent, criminal tendencies without adequate procedure to determine the guilt of the accused, denies
society the right the law of crime should be designed to, give,
Undue advantages of accused over the state:- Granting an accused
the right to appeal while giving to the state no such right gives 6ne
charged with 'crime an undue advantage, when the acquittal is the
result of an error in law p-ejddicial to the state. Rather than punish an innocent man, the law allows appeal to *the court of last resort, upon any provocation whatever, provided necessary motions
and' objection§ are timely made by counsel for the defense, from the
solicitor's brow-beating of a witness to the commission of a serious
error in law by the trial judge. On the other hand, the defense
attorney need not labor under any apprehension that his court room
behaviour, or. a misperformance of the trial judge in construing or
dictating the law, will subject his client to a new trial. For once
an acquittal is had, the accused may not be tried again as he may
not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
Inconsistency in the criminal and civil law: There exists a some
what serious inconsistency in the civil and criminal law. On the one
hand the sovereign state is all powerful in that, without its consent,
it may not be sued. While on the other hand, in criminal prosecutions, the sovereign gives way to the superior rights of the accused.
This is not to advocate an absolute parity in civil and criminal law
and their processes, for the end results differ drastically. In a criminal action the accused may be fighting for his life, while in a civil
60. Just when jeopardy attaches is.
a matter of diversified comment, but the
rule in South Carolina is generally adhered to. See note 31, supra.
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suit the stakes are not so great. On the other hand there should
not exist such a disparity as to prevent justice from taking its proper
toll.
STATE APPEiLATE LEGISLATION-

CON

Stare Decisis: Under this doctrine, principles of law have been
promulgated by constitutional conventions, by statutes enacted by
the general assembly, but mainly under decisions of courts of last
resort. It has become an almost unyielding custom in South Carolina, as well as most of the other states, to stand upon established
principles, the reason being that principles of law have become so
fundamentally imbedded in our juridical system that they have become almost adamant.
One of these principles relates to former jeopardy. For scores.
of years society has been satisfied with a rendition of a verdict of
acquittal of one charged with crime, whether or not such acquittal
was predicated upon legal error. To allow the state to appeal would
work an innovation in the stabilized doctrine of stare decisis- to
which hordes of the general public would object.
State takes advantage of its own error: To allow the state to appeal is to allow it to take advantage of its own error, through no
fault of the accused. The state is sovereign, and as such, can commit no wrong. Therefore, when a judicial officer of the state commits an error in the administration of justice, the error inuring to
the benefit of the defendant, by effecting an acquittal, the state should
have no complaint.
Expense incurred by accused: Frequently crimes are committed by
people who have had poor educational and cultural advantages.
Many offenders have accumulated little from a monetary or material
standpoint. They are oftentimes unable to procure paid counsel;
and frequently appointed counsel has not had the benefit of experience necessary to defend adequately the accused. The duty
of appointed counsel cannot be said to extend to an appeal; the taking of an appeal being merely discretionary. As a consequence the
accused may be unable to procure satisfactory counsel.
REBUTTAL AND CONCLUSION

It is true that stare decisis dictates uniformity in the law. But
must there be uniformity to the exclusion of justice? It is happily
conceded that to expose one to a second trial, after a previous acquittal in a trial free from error, is to subject him to a danger shocking to the sense of decency and fair dealing. But is one unduly taken
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advantage of by being subjected to a second trial for the express
purpose of rectifying an error prejudicial to the state, and to society
as a whole?
Can it really be said that the state is taking advantage of its own
error by being permitted an appeal on a verdict in favor of one accused ? Is not everyone- including officers of the court and jurists
-subject
to human frailties? Granting the state the privilege of
rectifying errors perpetrated by one of its officers or judges is in
reality a grant to society to avail itself of the right which the sover'eign state owes to the public, and which heretofore the public has
been denied.
The position in which an accused would be placed were he subject to an appeal by the state warrants sympathy, provided of course,
the accused is the victim of the far reaching arm of poverty. Although the law as it exists apparently provides that appeals by appointed counsel are purely discretionary, it is inconceivable that an
act granting the state the right to appeal would in turn deny to the
defendant counsel. Such a denial would be, on its face, unconstitutional. The objection that such appointed counsel would not be as
experienced as desired, if objections there be, could be corrected by
the installation of a public defender.
The scope of this writing, as was stated at the beginning, is to
present for consideration plausable reasoning for and against appeals by the state in criminal prosecutions. It does not purport to
advise upon what terms state appeals should be allowed. In this
connection, however, it might be noted that the statutes of Connecticut and Vermont form a sound pattern from which to proceed.
The writer is of the opinion that state appellate rights should, to
some degree, be extended; and it has been affirmatively shown that
an extension within reason would not abridge the constitutional
guaranties of an accused.
The doctrine of double jeopardy - no man shall twice be tried
for the same offense - is a profound and fundamental concept in
the law which should be adhered to, provided the doctrine is not
abrogated through a fiction in the law. The danger to which an accused is exposed should be a real and continuing one from the time
jeopardy attaches until a trial free from error is terminated. 60
Under the present application of the law of former jeopardy, is it
not a fictious absurdity to hold that on a second trial, one is being
placed in danger of his life, limb, or liberty, for a second time when
a verdict has been rendered in favor of the defendant in a former
trial, but that he is not in second jeopardy when a verdict in favor
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